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OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
The United States appeals the decision of the District 
Court to vacate and merge several of Douglas Kennedy‟s 
counts of conviction.  A jury convicted Kennedy in July 2004 
of crimes related to his possession with intent to distribute 
narcotics and his possession of two handguns.  At the initial 
sentencing, the District Court granted Kennedy‟s motion for a 
new trial with respect to four counts of conviction.  We 
reversed on appeal.  On our limited remand for “re-sentencing 
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only,” the District Court sua sponte found certain counts of 
conviction multiplicitous and vacated another count on the 
basis that its own jury charge was plainly erroneous.  We will 
vacate the District Court‟s judgment, once again reinstate all 
counts of conviction, and remand for resentencing.  
Regrettably, we find it necessary to direct the Chief Judge of 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
to reassign this case, and all related matters, to a different 
district court judge on remand. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 In October and November 2004, Drug Enforcement 
Administration agents discovered a heroin distribution 
network operating out of a house in Clifton, New Jersey.  The 
agents obtained information from wiretapped cell phone 
conversations that members of the network intended to make 
a sale at a Burger King restaurant in Newark, New Jersey on 
November 6, 2004.  At the appointed hour, agents monitoring 
the Burger King observed two individuals from the Clifton 
house arrive in a livery cab.  A black Cadillac automobile 
with tinted windows soon pulled into the parking lot.  
Carrying a red shopping bag with 200 bricks of heroin,
1
 a 
woman exited the livery cab, got into the back seat of the 
Cadillac, then returned to the cab with a brown bag 
containing $24,000 in cash.  As the vehicles left, agents 
tracked the Cadillac to a house in Irvington, New Jersey, and 
watched Kennedy exit from the driver‟s seat and enter the 
                                              
1
 A “brick” of heroin is 50 single-use envelopes of heroin 
bundled together.  Appendix (“App.”) 382-83. 
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house.  Parked in the driveway at the Irvington house was a 
green Lincoln Navigator automobile.   
 
 Based in part on these observations, agents obtained a 
search warrant for the house in Clifton.  The search 
uncovered $72,000 in cash, large quantities of heroin stored 
in bags that resembled the red shopping bag seen in the 
Burger King transaction, and equipment used to process and 
package heroin.  Agents also seized a ledger that recorded 
heroin transactions, and in particular listed the November 6 
transaction.  Esther Grullon, who was present in the Clifton 
house at the time of the search, quickly agreed to cooperate 
with the Government.  She admitted that she took part in the 
Burger King transaction with Kennedy, who, she reported, 
was the driver of the Cadillac.  One week earlier, she 
revealed, Kennedy and another man met her at the same 
Burger King to purchase a separate order of 200 bricks of 
heroin.   
 
 Armed with evidence of Kennedy‟s involvement in the 
drug ring, agents went to the Irvington residence to conduct 
surveillance the next morning, November 9, 2004.  When 
they arrived, the black Cadillac was parked in the driveway, 
but the Lincoln Navigator was gone.  Kennedy drove up to 
the house in the Lincoln some time later.  Agents approached 
him, confirmed that he lived in the Irvington house, and 
placed him under arrest.  They then obtained his consent to 
search the house, the Cadillac, and the Lincoln.  Inside the 
home they found $8,300 in cash, ammunition, and a bag 
containing 10 grams of crack cocaine.  Over the course of the 
search, Kennedy admitted that the bag of cocaine was his and 
that he was paid to transport the red shopping bag in the 
November 6 Burger King transaction. 
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 Agents seized both vehicles and moved them to a 
secure location for a search by other agents and a drug-
sniffing dog.  Hidden under the center console of the Lincoln, 
they discovered, was a secret compartment containing a 
loaded handgun and four glassine envelopes with .15 grams 
of heroin.  The brand stamped on the envelopes did not match 
the brands of heroin sold from the house in Clifton.  The 
search did not uncover weapons or drugs inside the Cadillac.  
A year later, however, in November 2005, an employee 
performing routine maintenance on the Cadillac noticed 
abnormally loose wiring and a suspicious construction of the 
side panels on the center console.  He dislodged one of the 
panels, exposing a secret compartment that had been 
overlooked in the first search of the Cadillac.  Inside, agents 
found a second loaded handgun and 41 bricks of heroin.  This 
heroin weighed 103.9 grams and bore a brand stamp that 
matched a stamp used by Grullon and the other Clifton 
distributors. 
 
B. 
 
 On January 12, 2006, a federal grand jury returned an 
indictment charging Kennedy with two counts of possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 841(b)(1)(B), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 
U.S.C. § 2, as well as one count of possession of a weapon by 
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The 
matter was assigned to an able, hardworking, and respected 
District Judge of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.   
 
At the arraignment, the Assistant United States 
Attorney (“AUSA”) detailed Kennedy‟s sentencing exposure, 
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but emphasized that the recently uncovered evidence of the 
second gun and drugs in the Cadillac portended significantly 
greater exposure.  The AUSA stated that if the parties did not 
reach a plea agreement, the Government planned to seek a 
superseding indictment charging Kennedy with two violations 
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  If proven, those charges alone would 
subject Kennedy to a mandatory 30 years in prison, to be 
served consecutively to any other sentence imposed.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (setting a five-year mandatory 
minimum for a violation of the statute), (c)(1)(C)(i) (setting a 
25-year mandatory minimum for a “second or subsequent 
conviction” under the statute). 
 
 When plea negotiations faltered, the Government 
sought and obtained a superseding indictment on March 14, 
2006 and a second superseding indictment on May 23, 2006.  
The latter indictment contained eight counts.  Count 1 
charged that from October 30, 2004 to November 9, 2004, 
Kennedy conspired with others to distribute and possess with 
intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a substance 
containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Count 2, 
which referred to the heroin found in the Lincoln, charged 
possession with intent to distribute a quantity of heroin in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2.  Count 3 charged possession of a firearm in furtherance 
of the intended distribution of the heroin discovered in the 
Lincoln, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2.  Count 4, 
which referred to the heroin found in the Cadillac, charged 
possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of 
heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B), and 
18 U.S.C. § 2.  Count 5 charged possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of the conspiracy (Count 1) and in furtherance of 
the intended distribution of the heroin discovered in the 
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Cadillac (Count 4), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2.  
Count 6, which referred to the cocaine found in the Irvington 
home, charged possession with intent to distribute five grams 
or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) 
and (b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Count 7, which referred to 
the gun found in the Lincoln, charged possession of a weapon 
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  
Count 8, which referred to the gun found in the Cadillac, 
charged possession of a weapon by a convicted felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).   
 
 The District Court held a four-day jury trial.  After the 
close of evidence but before summations, and without the 
jury present, the court addressed Kennedy and his family 
present in the courtroom.  Explaining that he has “never had 
this conversation with a defendant before,” the Judge warned 
Kennedy that, if he were to be convicted on all charges, the 
court will have “absolutely no discretion” and “no choice” but 
to impose a 40-year sentence.  App. 678-79.  The Judge 
walked through the “extremely different” options facing 
Kennedy:  either plead guilty and serve “an appropriate 
punishment” or risk a verdict that would result in “spending 
the rest of [his] life in jail and maybe never coming out 
because [he‟d] be an old man.”  Id. at 679-80.  Kennedy 
elected to proceed with the trial.  The next day, on July 28, 
the jury found him guilty on all counts.   
 
Kennedy‟s attorney did not seek post-conviction relief 
or file a notice of appeal within the time allotted by the 
federal rules.  On October 24, 2006, Kennedy filed a pro se 
motion requesting appointment of new counsel.  The District 
Court granted the motion on November 2, 2006.  On 
November 15, 2007, Kennedy‟s newly-appointed counsel 
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moved for a new trial, arguing that the failure to move for a 
new trial within the period prescribed by the rules was 
excusable neglect.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2), 
45(b)(1)(B).  Through the motion, Kennedy contended that he 
had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not seek 
suppression of the gun and drugs found in the Cadillac.  
Moreover, he argued, his conviction was unlawful because 
the second superseding indictment improperly joined Counts 
2 and 3 — both of which involved contraband found in the 
Lincoln — to the remaining counts, which concerned the 
Cadillac and the conspiracy.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).  
Alternatively, he theorized, the evidence adduced at trial 
proved the existence of two unrelated conspiracies and thus 
impermissibly varied from the indictment, which charged a 
single conspiracy. 
 
On June 5, 2008, before ruling on the motion or 
proceeding to sentencing, the District Court held a status 
conference.  The Judge told Kennedy that “[o]ne of the only 
ways that you can release the Court . . . from imposing th[e] 
mandatory minimum is if you were to be able to provide 
cooperation to the Government in some form.”  App. 904.  
When discussions between Kennedy and the Government 
bore no fruit, the District Court scheduled sentencing for 
August 21, 2008, more than two years after the date of 
conviction.  
 
The court began the August 21 hearing by focusing on 
the pending motion for a new trial.  Over the Government‟s 
objection, it found excusable neglect because trial counsel 
effectively abandoned Kennedy after the conviction.  Turning 
to the merits, the court rejected Kennedy‟s misjoinder and 
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variance arguments but found the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim convincing.  Trial counsel‟s failure to question 
the validity of Kennedy‟s consent to the searches and his 
decision not to seek suppression of the Cadillac gun and 
drugs on chain-of-custody grounds, the District Court ruled, 
amounted to constitutionally deficient representation.
2
  
Finding that counsel‟s deficiency resulted in prejudicial 
convictions, the District Court granted Kennedy‟s motion for 
a new trial with respect to Counts 1, 4, 5, and 8 — all counts 
that were premised on the gun and drugs seized from the 
Cadillac.  On the remaining counts of conviction — Counts 2, 
3, 6, and 7 — the District Court imposed a 15-year term of 
incarceration, the minimum sentence authorized by Congress.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), 
(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 
Kennedy appealed and the Government cross-
appealed.  We affirmed the District Court‟s rejection of 
Kennedy‟s misjoinder argument and his effort to attain a new 
trial on all eight counts.  United States v. Kennedy (Kennedy 
I), 354 F. App‟x 632 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2009).  We held, 
however, that the District Court made two mistakes of law in 
its analysis of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
3
  
                                              
2
 In reaching this conclusion, the District Court denied the 
Government‟s request to obtain testimony from Kennedy‟s 
trial counsel to explore his trial strategy. 
 
3
 We also disapproved of the procedure employed by the 
District Court, reminding the court that claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel typically should be asserted in collateral 
proceedings, not on direct review or in motions for a new 
trial. 
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First, it erred in finding Kennedy‟s trial counsel 
constitutionally deficient by incorrectly placing upon the 
Government the burden to show that counsel was effective 
and by ignoring the possibility that counsel‟s decision not to 
mount a chain-of-custody attack was strategic.  Second, it 
neglected to address in its discussion of prejudice whether 
Kennedy would have prevailed in a motion to suppress the 
Cadillac evidence.  Based on the trial record, we concluded, 
Kennedy failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  We therefore reversed the grant of a new trial on 
Counts 1, 4, 5, and 8 and remanded “for re-sentencing only.”  
Id. at 639. 
 
 The District Court did not immediately set the matter 
for resentencing after we issued our mandate.  Instead, “in 
anticipation of resentencing,” it invited the parties to brief 
three issues:  (1) whether Counts 3 and 5 were multiplicitous; 
(2) whether it was plain error to use “and/or” language in the 
jury charge on Count 5; and (3) whether the jury charge was 
inconsistent with Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 
(1999).  App. 1016-17.  The Government submitted a 
sentencing memorandum that argued that only the 
multiplicity issue could be considered at sentencing; all other 
issues, it said, fell outside the mandate and were otherwise 
beyond the court‟s power to raise on its own initiative.  It also 
disputed the issues on the merits.  Kennedy did not submit 
briefing in anticipation of resentencing and did not file a 
second motion for a new trial. 
 
 The parties convened for resentencing on December 
20, 2010.  After a lengthy colloquy with the AUSA, the 
District Court announced that, even though it had not 
requested briefing on the matter, it would merge Counts 2 and 
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4 (the possession-with-intent-to-distribute counts) into a 
single count and likewise merge Counts 7 and 8 (the felon-in-
possession counts) into a single count.  The court explained 
that these sets of counts, which distinguished between 
contraband found in the Lincoln and contraband found in the 
Cadillac, charged Kennedy twice for single, undifferentiated 
offenses.  The court also vacated the jury‟s verdict on Count 
5, the second charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  Having 
amended the counts of conviction in this way, the District 
Court resentenced Kennedy to 15 years in prison on the 
remaining counts.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a), (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 
 Three days later, the District Court issued a 
memorandum opinion that set forth its reasoning.  United 
States v. Kennedy (Kennedy II), Crim. No. 2:06-00028, 2010 
WL 5418931 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2010).  Endeavoring to apply a 
plain error standard of review, it began with its multiplicity 
rulings on Counts 7 and 8, the § 922(g)(1) convictions.  The 
court identified as controlling authority United States v. Tann, 
which held that the allowable unit of prosecution under § 
922(g) is the incident of possession and that possession of 
two firearms “seized at the same time in the same location[] 
supports only one conviction and sentence under § 
922(g)(1).”  577 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2009).  Because 
Kennedy‟s gun in the Cadillac and his gun in the Lincoln 
“were within eyeshot of one another,” the District Court 
found that Kennedy had simultaneously possessed both 
firearms.  Kennedy II, 2010 WL 5418931, at *4.  To remedy 
the multiplicity, it merged Counts 7 and 8 into Count 7.  
  
 The District Court next found that Count 2, which 
charged possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 
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841(a) for the heroin in the Lincoln, and Count 4, which 
charged possession with intent to distribute under § 841(a) for 
the heroin in the Cadillac, also were impermissibly 
multiplicitous.  Punctuating its analysis for emphasis, it 
reasoned that both stashes of heroin were “seized by the 
police in a common operation working from a single 
surveillance post” and were “seized at the same time . . . and 
at the same street address.”  Id. at *6 (emphases in original).  
From this, the District Court concluded that Counts 2 and 4 
also imposed cumulative punishment.  Accordingly, it merged 
both counts into Count 2.
4
 
 
 Having merged Counts 2 and 4 and Counts 7 and 8, 
the District Court next concluded that it must also merge 
Counts 3 and 5, the counts brought under § 924(c).  As 
                                              
4
 The District Court wrote, “[N]o sentence will be imposed 
for Count IV in regard to the evidence found in the Cadillac, 
and Counts II and IV are merged into Count II.”  Kennedy II, 
2010 WL 5418931, at *7.  It did not mention that Counts 2 
and 4 charged Kennedy under separate penalty subsections of 
the statute:  Count 2 charged Kennedy under 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a) and (b)(1)(C), while Count 4 charged Kennedy under 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B).  Count 4, the count for the 
heroin found in the Cadillac, charged Kennedy for a larger 
quantity of heroin and carried the higher penalty, a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 10 years, in light of his prior felony 
drug conviction.  21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(B) (2006).  By 
choosing to merge Counts 2 and 4 into Count 2, the count that 
charged “a quantity of heroin” and carried no mandatory 
penalty, the District Court effectively wiped out the jury‟s 
finding that Kennedy had possessed with intent to distribute 
over 100 grams of heroin.  
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charged and tried, those counts relied on distinct predicate 
crimes.  Count 3, which charged possession of the Lincoln 
handgun, furthered the intended distribution of the heroin 
found in the Lincoln (Count 2).  And Count 5, which charged 
possession of the Cadillac handgun, furthered the intended 
distribution or conspiracy to distribute the heroin found in the 
Cadillac (Counts 4 and/or 1).  Now that Counts 2 and 4 had 
been merged into a coterminous predicate offense, the District 
Court reasoned, controlling precedent permitted punishment 
for only one § 924(c) count.  Id. at *8 (citing United States v. 
Diaz, 592 F.3d 467, 471 (3d Cir. 2010)).   
 
Recognizing that its rationale with regard to Count 5 
made sense only insofar as it assumed that the jury believed 
that Kennedy used the Cadillac handgun in furtherance of 
Count 4, but not Count 1, the District Court pivoted to 
consider the propriety of the jury charge on Count 5.  It 
focused on the portion of the instruction that permitted the 
jury to convict if it found that Kennedy used the Cadillac 
handgun in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in Count 1 
“and/or” the distribution charged in Count 4.  This “and/or” 
language, reasoned the District Court, might have led some 
jurors to conclude that Kennedy used the Cadillac gun in 
furtherance of the intended heroin distribution charged in 
Count 4, while others might have concluded that Kennedy 
used the Cadillac gun in furtherance of the heroin conspiracy 
charged in Count 1.  Even though the jurors unanimously 
found Kennedy guilty on Counts 1 and 4 and received a 
general unanimity instruction, the District Court reasoned, 
they might not have agreed unanimously on which predicate 
crime supported Kennedy‟s conviction in Count 5 because the 
court did not give a unanimity instruction specific to the 
count.  Analogizing to Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 
14 
 
813 (1999), a case that did not interpret § 924(c),
5
 it held that 
the predicate crimes in a § 924(c) charge are elements of the 
crime, and that the “and/or” language of the charge prevented 
anyone from knowing whether the jury unanimously agreed 
on the predicate crime.  This, the District Court concluded, 
was not harmless error, and in fact was plain error.  To 
remedy the mistake, the court vacated Kennedy‟s conviction 
on Count 5 and declined to impose the 25-year mandatory 
sentence prescribed by § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). 
 
  The Government filed this timely appeal.
6
 
 
 
                                              
5
 Richardson involved 21 U.S.C. § 848(a), a statute that 
forbids individuals from engaging in a “continuing criminal 
enterprise.”  To obtain a conviction under the statute, the 
Government must prove, among other things, that the 
defendant committed a violation of a federal drug laws that 
was “part of a continuing series of violations” of federal drug 
laws.  21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2).  The question was whether the 
jury must agree unanimously on each violation in the series, 
or whether the jury need only agree unanimously that the 
defendant committed a series of violations.  Richardson, 526 
U.S. at 817-18.  The Supreme Court held that each violation 
in the series is an element of the crime on which the jury must 
agree unanimously.  Id. at 824.  The District Court extended 
the reasoning in Richardson to conclude that a jury must 
unanimously agree on which offense is the predicate offense 
in a charge under § 924(c).  
 
6
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3731 and 3742(b). 
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II. 
 
 This is our second encounter with this case.  The 
mandate in our first opinion instructed the District Court, on 
remand, to conduct “re-sentencing only.”  Kennedy I, 354 F. 
App‟x at 639.  The Government argues that the District Court 
ignored that directive when it vacated Kennedy‟s conviction 
in Count 5.  We must agree. 
 
A. 
 
From the earliest days of the republic, and continuing 
through today, the Supreme Court has “consistently held that 
an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the 
mandate issued by an appellate court.”  Briggs v. Pa. R. Co., 
334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948) (citing Ex parte Sibbald v. United 
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488 (1838); Boyce‟s Ex‟rs v. 
Grundy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 275 (1835); The Santa Maria, 23 
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 431 (1825); Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch 313 
(1809)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2106; In re Sanford Fork & 
Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895).  As the Court explained 
in Ex parte Sibbald v. United States,   
 
Whatever was before the court, and is disposed of, is 
considered as finally settled.  The inferior court is 
bound by the decree as the law of the case; and must 
carry it into execution, according to the mandate.  
They cannot vary it, or examine it for any other 
purpose than execution; or give any other or further 
relief; or review it upon any matter decided on appeal 
for error apparent; or intermeddle with it, further than 
to settle so much as has been remanded. 
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37 U.S. at 492.  The principle, as firmly ingrained as it is 
fundamental to our hierarchical system of justice, “has 
remained essentially unchanged in nearly one hundred fifty 
years.”  Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 
857 (3d Cir. 1994).  By now, “[i]t is axiomatic that on remand 
for further proceedings after [a] decision by an appellate 
court, the trial court must proceed in accordance with the 
mandate and the law of the case as established on appeal.”  
Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 
949 (3d Cir. 1985).  “A trial court must implement both the 
letter and spirit of the mandate, taking into account the 
appellate court‟s opinion and the circumstances it embraces.”  
Id. 
 
This mandate rule serves important purposes.  It 
preserves the proper allocation of authority within the tiered 
federal court structure set up by Congress and the 
Constitution.  Casey, 14 F.3d at 857; Litman v. Mass. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1508 (11th Cir. 1987).  It 
promotes predictability and finality by notifying parties of the 
matters that remain open on remand and committing the rest 
to final resolution.  And it safeguards stability in the 
administration of justice, for the orderly functioning of the 
judiciary would no doubt crumble if trial judges were free to 
disregard appellate rulings.  See Litman, 825 F.2d at 1511-12 
(“Post mandate maneuvering in the district courts would 
undermine the authority of appellate courts and create a great 
deal of uncertainty in the judicial process.”); cf. Hutto v. 
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (“[U]nless we wish anarchy 
to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of 
this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no 
17 
 
matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it 
to be.”). 
We must examine whether the District Court adhered 
to the mandate in our first opinion or whether it ventured 
beyond its authority.
7
  After we remanded for resentencing, 
the District Court did not consult the mandate or attempt to 
discern its scope.  Before merging counts of conviction and 
finding error in the jury charge for Count 5, it made a 
generalized claim of “latitude and discretion” to modify the 
jury‟s verdict in the course of resentencing Kennedy.  App. 
1048.  But it gave no explanation as to how those issues were 
germane to resentencing and declined to grapple with the 
Government‟s argument that the mandate curtailed its power 
to reconsider jury instructions.  Had it done so, it could not 
have avoided the limited scope of the mandate, which 
directed the District Court to undertake “re-sentencing only.”  
Kennedy I, 354 F. App‟x at 639.  Our use of the word “only” 
was not typical, nor was it accidental.  Most often, when we 
find error that necessitates resentencing, we remand for 
“resentencing,” expecting that the district court will attend to 
resentencing and nothing more.  By qualifying our mandate 
with the term “only,” we forewarned the District Court to be 
especially careful not to consider issues extraneous to 
resentencing.   
 
The District Court correctly concluded, and the 
Government conceded, that concerns over multiplicity may 
be addressed at sentencing.  See United States v. Pollen, 978 
F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1992).  The Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment “prevent[s] the sentencing court from 
                                              
7
 We review this question de novo.  Cooper Distrib. Co. v. 
Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 180 F.3d 542, 546 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”  
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).  It is within the 
power of a sentencing court to construe the unit of 
prosecution that Congress intended in drafting a criminal 
statute “„to ensur[e] that the total punishment [does] not 
exceed that authorized by the legislature.‟”  Pollen, 978 F.2d 
at 83 (quoting Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989)).  
In considering whether Counts 7 and 8, 2 and 4, and 3 and 5 
were multiplicitous, then, the District Court addressed a 
matter pertinent to resentencing and within the scope of the 
mandate. 
 
Reconsideration of the jury charge on Count 5, 
however, was not a matter germane to resentencing.  Jury 
instructions go to the validity of a conviction, not to the 
content of the punishment.  Confined on remand to conduct 
“re-sentencing only,” the District Court should have turned its 
attention to fashioning a sentence, consistent with the law, 
that was tailored to Kennedy and his crimes.  The procedure 
for sentencing is set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32.  That rule does not mention reconsideration of 
jury instructions.  We gave district courts additional guidance 
on the proper sentencing procedure in United States v. 
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  That procedure 
does not permit revisiting the jury instructions sua sponte.  
The conclusion is inescapable that the District Court, finding 
error in its jury charge on its own initiative, ventured beyond 
the scope of our mandate. 
 
B. 
 
The failure of the District Court to abide by our 
mandate is reason enough to vacate its order with respect to 
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Count 5.  Equally troubling, however, is the District Court‟s 
failure to consider whether it had legal power to identify and 
raise the matter sua sponte.  By finding its own jury 
instruction on Count 5 plainly erroneous and vacating 
Kennedy‟s conviction, the District Court implicitly ordered a 
new trial on the count.  See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (“Reversal [of a conviction] without any 
consideration of the effect of [an error of omission in a jury 
instruction] upon the verdict would send the case back for 
retrial[.]”).  That is, although Kennedy did not move for a 
new trial on Count 5 or choose to brief the matter upon the 
court‟s invitation, the District Court nevertheless persisted in 
granting him a new trial.  This decision was contrary to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, which permits a 
district court to vacate a judgment and grant a new trial only 
“[u]pon the defendant‟s motion.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 33; see 
also Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, advisory comm. notes, 1966 
amends. (“[A] judge has no power to order a new trial on his 
[or her] own motion, [but] can act only in response to a 
motion timely made by a defendant.”); United States v. 
Wright, 363 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Newman, 456 F.2d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 1972).  Because 
Kennedy made no such motion, the District Court was 
powerless under the federal rules to assert it on his behalf.  
 
* * * * * 
 
 Acting on its own initiative and contrary to our 
mandate, the District Court maneuvered beyond its authority 
in vacating the conviction on Count 5 and implicitly granting 
Kennedy a new trial.  Accordingly, we will reinstate the 
conviction on Count 5. 
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III. 
 
The Government argues that although the question of 
multiplicity fell within our mandate, the District Court erred 
in finding Counts 7 and 8, 2 and 4, and 3 and 5 multiplicitous.  
In each instance, the Government maintains that the District 
Court misapplied controlling precedent in holding that 
Kennedy was indicted and convicted twice for conduct that 
constituted a single offense.  Kennedy defends the District 
Court‟s authority to address multiplicity, but offers no 
defense of the court‟s decisions on the merits.  
 
Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in 
separate counts of an indictment.  United States v. Carter, 576 
F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1978); Charles Alan Wright & 
Andrew D. Leipold, Federal Practice & Procedure:  Criminal 
§ 142 (4th ed. 2008).  A multiplicitous indictment risks 
subjecting a defendant to multiple sentences for the same 
offense, an obvious violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause‟s 
protection against cumulative punishment.  See Hunter, 459 
U.S. at 366; Pollen, 978 F.2d at 83.  The purpose of the 
constitutional protection against duplicative punishment is “to 
ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts is confined to 
the limits established by the legislature.”  Ohio v. Johnson, 
467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984).  It is not surprising, then, that the 
test for multiplicity examines “„whether the legislature 
intended to make separately punishable the different types of 
conduct referred to in the various counts.‟”  United States v. 
Stanfa, 685 F.2d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Carter, 576 
F.2d at 1064).  In this endeavor, we look to each statute‟s 
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“unit of prosecution.”  Tann, 577 F.3d at 536; United States v. 
Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1982).
8
 
 
A. 
 
 The District Court first concluded that Counts 7 and 8, 
the felon-in-possession convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1), were multiplicitous.  Section 922(g) makes it 
unlawful “for any person . . . who has been convicted in any 
court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1).  The District Court reasoned that Counts 7 and 8 
must be merged because the Cadillac handgun and the 
Lincoln handgun were “within eyeshot of one another” and 
were “seized by the same group of police in the same 
operation at the same time at the same street address.”  
Kennedy II, 2010 WL 5418931, at *4-5 (emphases in 
original). 
 
In United States v. Tann, we held that Congress made 
the allowable unit of prosecution under § 922(g)(1) the 
defendant‟s incident of possession.  577 F.3d at 537.  The 
defendant in Tann was charged with two § 922(g) counts after 
officers in pursuit apprehended him and placed him under 
arrest in his bathroom.  Id. at 534.  The officers recovered 
ammunition for a handgun on the defendant‟s person and 
found the handgun in the bathroom.  Id. at 534-35.  We held 
that the seizure of the firearm and ammunition “at the same 
                                              
8
 We review a claim of multiplicity de novo.  United States v. 
Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1215 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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time in the same location” supported only one § 922(g)(1) 
conviction.  Id. at 537.  In arriving at this conclusion, we 
relied heavily on United States v. Marino, which held that 
under a similar felon-in-possession statute, “simultaneous 
possession of several firearms by a convicted felon 
constitutes a single offense[.]”  682 F.2d 449, 454 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
 
The District Court identified Tann and Marino as 
controlling but misapplied their reasoning.  Both decisions 
were concerned with the character of the defendant‟s incident 
of possession; the conduct of the police at the time of the 
seizure was inconsequential.  The District Court‟s emphasis 
on the fact that the same group of police seized both guns in a 
single operation therefore was mistaken, for neither factor 
bears on the multiplicity inquiry.  What matters is the 
defendant‟s “course of . . . treatment of the firearms,” which 
“may not be viewed in a frozen, momentary state 
immediately prior to the seizure.”  United States v. Mullins, 
698 F.2d 686, 687 (4th Cir. 1983).   
 
The District Court correctly found that both guns were 
seized at approximately the same time, but it was mistaken in 
concluding that the guns were possessed in the same location.  
Like “simultaneous possession,” “same location” is an 
imprecise concept, one whose contours acquire definition by 
reference to case law.  The District Court understood “same 
location” to mean “same street address,” inferring that 
because the guns were discovered in vehicles parked at the 
same address, Kennedy possessed them simultaneously.  This 
represents a marked expansion of Tann and collides with 
myriad decisions of Courts of Appeals outside this circuit that 
understand the concept of simultaneous possession in the 
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same location more narrowly.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294, 296, 298 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding 
that it was appropriate to bring two charges under § 
922(g)(1), one for guns seized from defendant‟s barn and a 
second for guns seized from defendant‟s truck that had 
previously been stored with the guns in the barn); United 
States v. Keen, 104 F.3d 1111, 1112, 1118 & n.11 (9th Cir. 
1996) (holding that simultaneous seizure of a shotgun and 
ammunition from the same room supports one § 922(g)(1) 
conviction, but observing that “[g]uns that are acquired at 
different times or stored in separate places permit separate 
punishment to be imposed for each violation of § 922(g)”); 
United States v. Hutching, 75 F.3d 1453, 1460 (10th Cir. 
1996) (explaining that “simultaneous possession of multiple 
firearms generally constitutes only . . . one offense unless 
there is evidence that the weapons were stored in different 
places,” and finding that firearms stored in the defendant‟s 
bedroom, a car in his garage, and his truck could be charged 
as separate offenses) (quotation marks omitted); United States 
v. Bonavia, 927 F.2d 565, 569 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining 
that “separate possessions can be established by showing . . . 
that the weapons were stored in different places” and finding 
counts multiplicitous when the Government presented no 
such evidence) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. 
Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 717, 721 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
multiple charges were permissible when firearms were found 
in defendant‟s bedroom closet and car because they were 
“stored separately”).  
 
The evidence adduced at trial showed that Kennedy 
stored two different firearms in separate vehicles — one in 
the Cadillac, and a second in the Lincoln.  The firearms were 
kept in secret compartments that contained heroin branded 
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with different stamps, suggesting different distributors.  The 
Lincoln gun was in the car with Kennedy upon his arrival at 
the Irvington residence before his arrest, indicating that the 
firearms were some distance apart while he was out driving.  
These facts were enough to show that Kennedy did not 
simultaneously possess the guns, but rather stored them in 
separate locations, albeit at times on the premises of the same 
street address.  On these facts, it was proper for the 
Government to charge separate § 922(g)(1) counts.  
Kennedy‟s convictions will not twice punish him for the same 
offense.  The District Court erred in finding otherwise and in 
merging Counts 7 and 8. 
 
B. 
 
The District Court next held that Counts 2 and 4, the 
possession-with-intent-to-distribute convictions under 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a), also were multiplicitous.  Section 841(a) 
makes it unlawful “for any person knowingly or intentionally 
. . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with 
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance[.]”  21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The District Court 
reasoned that Counts 2 and 4 must be merged because the 
heroin seized from the Cadillac and the heroin seized from 
the Lincoln were “seized by the police in a common operation 
working from a single surveillance post” and were “seized at 
the same time . . . and at the same street address.”  Kennedy 
II, 2010 WL 5418931, at *6 (emphases in original). 
 
We confronted a similar allegation of multiplicitous 
charges in United States v. Carter.  The defendant in Carter 
was convicted under § 841(a) both of distributing 677 grams 
of heroin and of possessing with intent to distribute 95 grams 
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of diluted heroin.  576 F.2d at 1063.  He argued that these 
separate counts constituted a single, undifferentiated offense.  
We disagreed, explaining that “Congress . . . intend[ed] that 
two distinct offenses, punishable by separate sentences, 
should be seen to arise when the evidence shows — as it did 
here — that the acts of possession and distribution involved 
discrete quantities of narcotics[.]”  Id. at 1064. 
 
As with the § 922(g)(1) counts, the District Court 
mistakenly focused on the conduct of the police when it 
merged the § 841(a) counts.  It should have discussed the trial 
testimony that the stash of heroin in the Lincoln and the stash 
of heroin in the Cadillac had different compositions and 
purities and bore different brand stamps.  The quantities and 
means of packaging, too, were distinct:  the Cadillac heroin 
totaled 103.9 grams and was bundled in bricks, while the 
Lincoln heroin totaled .15 grams and was packaged only in 
glassine envelopes.  And, as discussed, the heroin was stored 
in separate vehicles.  Our reasoning in Carter compels the 
conclusion that Counts 2 and 4 charged separate offenses and 
that the District Court erred in merging the convictions. 
 
C. 
 
 Finally, the District Court suggested that it could 
merge Counts 3 and 5, the § 924(c) counts, because it had 
previously merged Counts 2 and 4, the predicate drug 
offenses.  Section 924(c) imposes additional years of 
imprisonment on “any person who, during and in relation to 
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or 
carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, 
possesses a firearm.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  The unit of 
prosecution for a § 924(c) count, we have held, is the 
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underlying drug trafficking offense.  Diaz, 592 F.3d at 474.  
Because Kennedy was convicted of two distinct possession-
with-intent-to-distribute counts, and because the jury properly 
found that he possessed separate firearms in furtherance of 
those crimes, his concomitant § 924(c) convictions were not 
multiplicitous.   
 
* * * * * 
 
 We conclude that Counts 7 and 8, 2 and 4, and 3 and 5 
were not multiplicitous and that Kennedy‟s punishment on 
those counts comports with the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The 
District Court erred in concluding otherwise and in merging 
the counts of conviction.   
 
IV. 
 
A. 
 
The Government asks us to direct the Chief Judge of 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
to reassign this case on remand.  It also requests reassignment 
of all related matters, including Kennedy‟s recent petition for 
collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The District Court‟s 
conduct, argues the Government, demonstrates that its ability 
to serve as a neutral arbiter might reasonably be questioned 
and that reassignment is necessary to restore to the 
proceedings the appearance of impartiality.  Kennedy 
maintains that a reasonable person could not ascribe bias or 
partiality to the District Court and that reassignment is 
unwarranted. 
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 Two statutes give us authority to order reassignment.  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a federal judge must self-
disqualify from “any proceeding in which [her or] his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  When the 
judge fails to do so, we may order recusal.  United States v. 
Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 213 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1411 (3d Cir. 1994); Alexander v. 
Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Alternatively, we may order reassignment of a judge pursuant 
to our supervisory powers, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2106.  
Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1411.  Under either statute, reassignment is 
an exceptional remedy, one that we weigh seriously and order 
sparingly. 
 
“The test for recusal under § 455(a) is whether a 
reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would 
conclude that the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”  In re Kensington Int‟l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 
(3d Cir. 2003).  An objective inquiry, this test is not 
concerned with the question whether a judge actually harbors 
bias against a party.  Primerica Holdings, 10 F.3d at 162.  
Because § 455(a) aims not only to protect both the rights of 
the individual litigants, but also to promote the public‟s 
confidence in the judiciary, our analysis focuses on upholding 
the appearance of justice in our courts.  Id.; In re Sch. 
Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 
The Government submits that a reasonable observer 
could detect distrust of and disfavor toward the Government 
in the District Court proceedings.  It first points to the Judge‟s 
repeated questioning of the propriety of the prosecution.  The 
Judge explained that he believed the Government obtained 
the second superseding indictment because Kennedy refused 
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to plead guilty.  He castigated the Government for charging 
Kennedy with two separate counts under § 924(c) after 
Kennedy declined to cooperate or plead.  In the Judge‟s view, 
this was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion made in bad 
faith to punish Kennedy for going to trial.  Addressing the 
prosecutor personally, he stated directly:   
 
[P]rosecutors . . . do have some discretion 
which they usually exercise responsibly, 
reasonably, with some interest in justice and 
some weighing of what the conduct really is.  
Okay?  By what you did in terms of the 
Superseding Indictment, you‟ve exposed him 
now to a 40-year mandatory minimum on very 
suspicious conduct. . . .  And you were the one 
exercising the discretion when you didn‟t get a 
plea to decide, well, now I‟ll really whack him 
on the head and I‟ll bring back two Draconian 
charges, two 924 charges.   
 
App. 953-54; see also id. at 958 (“That Superseding 
Indictment was, he didn‟t plead guilty to the first three counts 
and therefore if he was going to exercise his right to go to 
trial, he‟s going to pay the price because you‟re going to 
charge him with Draconian charges.  That‟s the problem I had 
here.”).   
 
Insinuating additional prosecutorial misconduct, the 
Judge repeatedly characterized the timing of the 
Government‟s discovery of the gun and heroin in the 
Cadillac, one year after the initial search, as “suspicious.”  
See App. 941:17, 942:4, 942:23, 954:6, 954:12, 955:19.  
Elsewhere, he berated the AUSA and questioned his 
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competence.  Early in the initial sentencing hearing, the Judge 
erroneously placed the burden of demonstrating the 
effectiveness of Kennedy‟s trial counsel on the Government, 
then denied the Government an adjournment so it could 
prepare.  When the Judge faulted the Government for not 
submitting an affidavit from Kennedy‟s trial counsel, the 
AUSA responded that it was not his responsibility to solicit 
that testimony, for Kennedy bore the burden of proving the 
claim.  The following interaction transpired:   
 
Prosecutor: Well, Judge, beyond that I‟m not 
really sure how we would ever 
elicit the facts at this point. 
 
The Court: [AUSA], how long have you been 
an Assistant U.S. Attorney? 
 
Prosecutor: About four and a half years. 
 
The Court: Okay.  And how long have you 
been a lawyer? 
 
Prosecutor: Approximately 15. 
 
The Court:  Okay.  You‟re telling me you 
don‟t know how you would put 
forth probative facts on any 
motion or anything before a judge 
if they were so probative and 
important?  Is that what you just 
said? 
 
App. 927.   
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Later in the same hearing, the prosecutor stated that 40 
years in prison was an appropriate punishment for Kennedy‟s 
conduct, an opinion that led to this colloquy: 
 
The Court: I want to hear on the record, I just 
do.  Forget — for this conduct, 
you in good conscience can go to 
sleep at night tonight and say this 
man deserved 40 years mandatory 
minimum, the rest of his life in 
jail for this conduct?  I want to 
hear you say that. 
 
Prosecutor: I‟m saying that. 
 
The Court: You believe that? 
 
Prosecutor: That is absolutely correct. 
 
The Court: Sit down.  Unless you have 
something more to say that‟s 
enlightening to me, you can sit 
down. 
 
App. 957.  On a separate occasion, the Judge interrupted the 
AUSA‟s argument and told him, once again, to “sit down.”  
App. 929:25-930:1.  This treatment of the AUSA appears to 
stand in contrast to the Judge‟s demeanor at the same hearing 
toward Kennedy, whom he periodically referred to by his first 
name, Douglas.  See, e.g., App. 933:15, 935:2, 935:3, 935:6, 
936:12, 938:7, 938:10.   
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We agree with the Government that, taken together, 
these interactions cast a pall of distrust over the prosecution‟s 
handling of the case.  When a judge openly questions the 
integrity of the Government‟s evidence collection practices, 
undermines the professionalism of the prosecutor, and 
accuses the Government of prosecuting in bad faith — all 
without evidence of governmental misconduct — a 
reasonable observer could very well find neutrality wanting in 
the proceedings. 
 
Other aspects of these proceedings are equally 
troubling.  The Government points out that, at times, the 
District Court Judge‟s conduct veered closer to that of a 
defense attorney than an impartial adjudicator.  At trial, he 
questioned witnesses substantively to clarify matters left 
unaddressed by defense counsel.  App. 327-28.  Before the 
jury rendered its verdict, he urged Kennedy to consider 
pleading guilty so as to avoid the 40-year mandatory 
sentence, an entreaty that was arguably problematic in light of 
the Federal Rules‟ prohibition on judicial involvement in plea 
negotiations.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1); United States v. 
Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 520 (3d Cir. 2010).  Before the initial 
sentencing, he urged Kennedy to cooperate with the 
Government so as to release the court from its obligation to 
impose the mandatory sentence.  At resentencing, he 
exhibited a willingness to raise arguments on behalf of 
Kennedy, even when Kennedy chose not to press those 
arguments and despite the fact that certain matters were 
beyond the scope of the mandate and the power of the court 
to remedy.  And throughout the proceedings, he characterized 
the charges and sentence as “Draconian,” “excessive,” and 
“offensive.”  See, e.g., App. 13, 942:14, 953:12, 953:14, 
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954:17, 954:21, 978:9, 1048:19, 1053:19-20, 1060:2, 
1076:12, 1088:7-8. 
 
After considering the totality of these circumstances, 
we conclude that a reasonable observer, with knowledge of 
this case, could question the impartiality and neutrality of the 
proceedings.  Accordingly, we will order reassignment of this 
case and all related matters to a different judge on remand. 
 
B. 
 
 We do not make this decision lightly.  We recognize 
that sentencing is one of the most difficult tasks a district 
court judge must perform, and we have deep respect for the 
professionalism and seriousness of purpose that judges bring 
to sentencing proceedings.  Sentencing is particularly trying 
when a judge believes that the punishment mandated by 
Congress is not a just and proportional sanction for the 
conduct involved, as may have been the case here.  But our 
Constitution entrusts Congress with the power to define 
crimes and set punishment for those crimes.  Bell v. United 
States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955).  Judges must uphold 
legislative choices in this regard, made as they are by our 
elected representatives.   
 
Congress has chosen to require a 25-year mandatory, 
consecutive sentence for a “second or subsequent conviction” 
under § 924(c), even when the defendant‟s prior § 924(c) 
conviction has not become final.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i); 
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 136 (1993).  It did so 
with full knowledge that the Supreme Court has long 
accorded prosecutors broad charging discretion.  
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978); United 
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States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Esposito, 968 F.2d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 1992).  
To the extent that the District Court was dissatisfied with this 
state of affairs, the remedy lies with Congress.  See Gore v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“Whatever views 
may be entertained regarding severity of punishment, whether 
one believes in its efficacy or its futility . . . these are 
peculiarly questions of legislative policy.”).  In the meantime, 
it is not for the judiciary to seek to circumvent the language 
of § 924(c) and the verdict rendered by an impartial jury.  We 
must emphasize, once again:  “Ours is a nation of laws, not 
judges.”  United States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 
V. 
 
For the reasons stated, we will vacate the judgment 
and sentence imposed by the District Court; reinstate 
Kennedy‟s convictions in Counts 4, 5, and 8; and remand 
once again for resentencing only.  In so doing, we will direct 
the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey to assign this case and all related 
matters to a different district court judge.  
 
